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On 'The Vanity of God' 
A Reply to Taliaferro 
Daniel A. Campana 
An article entitled 'The Vanity of God' recently appeared in this journal 
and in it Charles Taliaferro attempted to exonerate the traditional Christian 
notion of God! from an apparent self-contradiction. Briefly put the alleged 
discrepancy was this: 
1. God, according to Christian tradition, can have no vices. 
2. Vanity is a vice. 
3. God's activity in creating, demanding worship, and redeeming strongly 
imply that God is vain. 
Therefore 
4. Since 2 and 3 taken together contradict 1, the Christian concept of God 
is self-contradictory. 
I shall call this central argument (I). Before proceeding with his assault on 
(I) it will be important to note that Taliaferro intimates that he holds to (II): 
5. God, according to Christian tradition, has all virtues. 2 
6. Humility is a virtue. 
Therefore 
7. God has the virtue of humility. 
And some form of (III): 
8. No one who is humble can be vain. 
9. God is humble. 
Therefore 
10. God is not vain. 
I intend to show that the traditional Christian doctrine of God is involved in 
self-contradiction only if one begins with misconceptions about 'vanity', 
'humility', and 'God'. In so doing I will demonstrate that the weakness of 
Taliaferro's argument against (I) is that he perpetuates these misconceptions. 
I will further show that it is not possible that God have the virtue of humility 
and that therefore (II) and (III) are unsound. 
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In the main, Taliaferro presents an argument against (I) by attacking 3. and 
implying the soundness of (II) and (III). In order to attack 3. he must show 
that neither a. God's creating man in His3 own image; nor b. God's demanding 
that His creatures worship Him; nor c. God's ordaining that He alone can be 
the active agent in the redemption of any of His creatures, entails that God 
is vain. 
In the case of creation (a.) Taliaferro argues that were God cloning His own 
ego He would indeed be "looking in a mirror"4 and thus be guilty of vanity. 
But on the contrary God created free agents. Thus creation can be seen as an 
act of "other-regarding." Of course, if God created, or recreated, free agents 
whose sole purpose was to worship Him then His action again appears to be 
the height of conceit so Taliaferro argues with respect to b. that in worship-
ping God attention is not to be placed upon God Himself but upon the 
excellences and perfections which He possesses. Redemption can be seen as 
an act of re-creation. Taliaferro thus dispenses with c. as well by describing 
redemption as the opening of new freedoms to free agents: an act of other-
centeredness. 
In the context of redemption in Christ, Taliaferro quotes Philippians 2:5s 
and suggests that in this redeeming activity God shows that He has the virtue 
of humility. In this way he insinuates (II). 
Although Taliaferro is not straightforward about (III) he suggests a form 
of it. "The God who comes to us as servant does not strike one naturally as 
the god of Narcissus."6 As it stands of course (III) is less than convincing: 
surely there are moral agents who are at one time humble and at another time 
vain, so 8. is false. But Taliaferro might revise 8. to read: Humility and vanity 
are incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be manifest in the same 
moral agent at the same moment. And revise 9. to read: Since humility is one 
of God's perfections, it cannot at any time be displaced by its complement. 
From this 10. would follow. 
Taliaferro has thus defended the Christian doctrine of God from the charge 
of self-contradiction and offered a positive argument for why God, according 
to Christian doctrine, could not be vain. The problem I wish to raise is that 
given the customary meanings of the terms 'vanity' and 'humility' it is dif-
ficult to see why anyone would wish to apply 'vanity', or how anyone could 
apply 'humility' to the God of Christian tradition. 
Taliaferro speaks of vanity as an illicit form of pride. Where "proper pride" 
is an appropriate attitude for a moral agent to have toward her strengths, 
vanity is "willful, unwarranted self-exaltation" and "disproportionate self-re-
gard" and "self-aggrandizement." Such an explanation of vanity is familiar. 
Aquinas spoke of this as a desire to excel in which one turns toward oneself 
and rejects all superiors.7 
If 'vanity' is to be applied to the God of Christian tradition then we must 
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delineate the point at which God's "proper pride" becomes vanity. In order 
to do this we must further delineate the points at which God's warranted 
self-exaltation becomes "unwarranted self-exaltation"; or when God's pro-
portionate self-regard becomes "disproportionate self-regard"; or when God 
is making Himself out to be 'greater than He really is'. When stated so baldly 
it is clear that these demands assume that there are limits to the grounds for 
God's self-exaltation and limits to the proportionment of God's self-regard; 
in short, limits to the greatness of God. But Christian tradition roundly denies 
just such limits.8 If there are no limits to the greatness of God then an 
unlimited amount of pride will still be "proper pride" and therefore appro-
priate for God as a moral agent. But if while exhibiting an unlimited amount 
of pride God does not transgress the bounds of "proper pride" then the term 
'vanity' as commonly understood simply does not apply to God as known in 
the Christian tradition. 
A similar problem arises with the term 'humility' when predicated of God. 
Taliaferro characterizes humility as 'being slow to believe the best about 
oneself and quick to believe so of others'. 9 Again this definition is acceptable 
and so also is Taliaferro's assumption that it is a virtue. We must ask then 
whether God has this virtue. Taliaferro may hold (as Aquinas argued) that 
God has all moral perfections lO• But as Alvin Plantinga has pointed out, God's 
properties have at least logical limits. II Is it logically possible for God as 
known in Christian tradition to have the virtue of humility? 
Taliaferro aIJudes to God's redemptive act in the incarnation and quotes 
Philippians 2:5 as evidence that God has humility. Two problems arise here: 
one exegetical and the other logical. Exegetically it must be noted that the 
humility referred to in Philippians 2:5 is, on the one hand an attitude the 
Philippians are to have as they attempt to imitate the Jesus of history, and on 
the other hand it provides the occasion for the exaltation of the Christ of 
redemptive history: "Therefore (on the basis of His incarnation) God has 
highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name, 
that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and 
under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the 
glory of God the Father. "12 Seen in its textual context humility is a virtue 
humans are to exhibit and it can even be used to describe the incarnate Jesus, 
but humility can hardly describe the God whose redemptive plan, culminating 
in Christ, was designed to bring about his own unlimited glory. 
I suggest that the reason God's redemptive plan does not exhibit humility 
is that it would be logically impossible for the God of Christian tradition to 
be humble. Humility as Taliaferro defines it entails recognition of personal 
Iimits.13 If I am slow to believe the best about myself then it must be because 
I have some reason for believing that I am not unlimited in my capacities. 
But if there are no non-logical limits to God's greatness then how could He 
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recognize the existence of personal limitations? And if no such recognition 
is logically possible then true humility is not logically possible for Him. 
Without engaging in an exegetical study to determine if Judeo-Christian 
tradition will allow Taliaferro's interpretation of God's activity in creating, 
demanding worship, and redeeming so that (I) would work, I offer that (I) is 
irrelevant because vanity could not apply to God. Further, against (II) and 
(III) 1 conclude that there is at least one moral perfection which is logically 
impossible for God to have: the virtue of humility. 
University of La Verne 
NOTES 
1. By 'traditional Christian notion of God' I refer to, and go along with, Taliaferro's 
adherence to traditional language of God as a personal being and his refusal to evade the 
question of the applicability of moral categories to God by talking about God as impersonal 
or impassible in the sense that God lacks feeling.(Charles Taliaferro, "The Vanity of God," 
Faith And Philosophy, vol.6, no.2, April 1989, p. 143.) 
2. Taliaferro seems to hold that God has all moral perfections (analogically?). Ibid, pp. 
146-47. 
3. Use of the masculine pronouns is maintained because the subject matter here is the 
traditional Christian doctrines and these were espoused in this manner. 
4. Ibid., p. 144. 
5. Ibid., p. 151. 
6. Ibid., p. 152. See also p. 142 where the qualities of vain persons seem to exclude the 
qualities of humble persons, so that one person could not be characterized as having both. 
7. Summa Theologica II, q.84, art.2. 
8. Isaiah 48: 11. 
9. Taliaferro, op. cit., pp. 141-42. 
10. God is "universally perfect because He lacks not any excellence which may be found 
in any genus." Summa Theologica I, q.4, art.2. cf. I, q.13, arts.2&5. 
11. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 
p.167. 
12. Philippians 2:9-11 RSV. 
13. Taliaferro, op. cit., p. 142. 
